Posts Tagged ‘tor’

QotW #23: Why is it difficult to catch Anonymous/Lulzsec?

2012-04-13 by roryalsop. 2 comments

This weeks question of the week was asked by user claws back in February 2011 and while a lot has happened since then, it is still a very valid question.

The top scoring answer, “What makes you think they don’t get caught”, by atdre, while more of a challenge to the original question, has proven to be quite appropriate, as over the last year various alleged members of Anonymous have been caught. Some through informants, others through intelligence work, however the remainder of the answers focus on the technical and structural reasons why Anonymous continues to be a major force on the Internet.

SteveS, Purge, mrnap, tylerl and others  mention the usual way attackers hide on the Internet – using machines in other countries, generally owned by unwitting individuals who have not protected them sufficiently (This includes botnets – but there are also willing botnets, provided by followers of Anonymous – who allow their machines to be used for attacks) and by routing through networks such as TOR (The Onion Router) so that even if law enforcement try to trace the connection back they will fail either because there are too many connections to track, or because some of the connections will pass through countries where the Internet Service Providers are not able or willing to assist with the trace.

I think Eli hit the nail on the head, however with “because anonymous can be anyone, literally” – as while there are certainly a core group of skilled and motivated individuals, there are many thousands of individuals who will contribute to an attack, and these individuals may be different from one month to the next as the nature of Anonymous allows people to join and take part as and when they want to, if a particular cause is of interest to them.

The Lulzsec spinoff from Anonymous appeared to be a deliberately short lived group who wanted to do something less political, and more for “the lulz” – focusing on large corporates and security organisations to highlight weaknesses in controls, and nealmcb provided links in comments to articles on this group in particular. In terms of detection, the same comments apply here as to the wider Anonymous group.

Liked this question of the week? Interested in reading it or adding an answer? See the question in full. Have questions of a security nature of your own? Security expert and want to help others? Come and join us at security.stackexchange.com

Tor: Exploiting the weakest link

2012-04-10 by lucaskauffman. 5 comments

Since the birth of the internet, there has been censorship. People have always been looking for ways to anonymously access the internet, either by proxy or VPN, however these still (can) log traffic origin and destination.

Since a few years there have been a few projects to anonymize traffic. One of the more famous ones is Tor (The Onion Router).

How Tor works

Tor uses servers and clients. When you request a webpage from your client, Tor will make an encrypted request to a randomly selected relay server called an Onion router. This Onion router knows who you are. Next thing the router does is ask another Onion router to relay the message. This second Onion router only knows the first Onion router. The second asks a third, the third asks the fourth, etc. No single router knows the complete route, however the client does.

The client can access a database which holds all the relays and if he wants, he can select his own route or a random route is selected. He then gets all the public keys for the route and encrypts his message in reverse order, starting with the public key of the last node, than the one to last node, etc. So the encryption is layered (just like the layers of an onion). However there is also a message for every node that contains the next hop. Now at the exit router the message is decrypted completely and the request for the webpage is made. For the webserver that serves the question, the client’s IP is the IP of the exit node.

The weakest link

So traffic is encrypted multiple times and relayed through different servers. This ensures anonymity. However… everyone can set up a Tor exit node … and everyone that has an exit node, can monitor the traffic.

The weakness in this technology is one we find in other technologies as well, the so called “user”.

A lot of people are concerned about their anonymity and figure they are safe when using Tor. They forget that when using a physical line or an encrypted Wifi AP, The chances of getting a Man in the Middle Attack (MMA) is small.

Now because we can easily host an exit node, we can sniff traffic from people who think they are anonymous, a lot of people in fact. At 20 Mbit (the max speed we allowed Tor to use), we got about 200 different Facebook sessions a day.

Facebook

Users forget about certain things, like facebook over https. I’ve heard people say “I’ve enabled https on my facebook account, so when I log in, I’m safe.” Well that’s good for them but they forget that often, if you do not explicitly state https for the facebook login page, your password and username is sent PLAIN TEXT over the internet. Facebook doesn’t know you want a secure line before you are logged in.Obviously this goes up for a lot of different sites other than Facebook.

The whole point of Tor is to be anonymous, but users get facebook accounts with often their full name and address on it, and then log in insecurelly.

One could write a script (and we made a proof of concept), that looks for usernames and passwords or hijacks sessions and automatically goes to a facebook like page “I am using Tor to be anonymous”.

I am not saying Tor is unsafe, all we wanted to proof is that people need to think twice before thinking they are anonymous and safe on the internet. There will always be people that want to do malicious stuff. We could have hijacked about 20 accounts in half an hour and revealed people who use Tor or get into their emailboxes. (like Dan Egerstad also prooved in 2007).

Youtube Video

The comments in the clip are in Dutch, but basically we set up a tor node and used tshark to capture traffic. We specified we were interested in http traffic coming/going from Facebook. We then took the session cookie and injected it into our browser which then automatically logs us into Facebook as that user.

Conclusion

Tor is a good anonymity provider, but like all tools, you need to use it in the correct way.