Archive for April, 2012

QotW#25: Introducing QotW

2012-04-27 by roryalsop. 2 comments

What is the QotW?

At nearly 3,500 questions we have a wide variety of topics, answers and styles, and in general when someone comes to the site they are looking for answers to a specific problem, or to give answers to questions in their field so they may not see the vast majority of questions. Question of the Week posts on meta.security.stackexchange.com allow the community to vote for their favourite question to be discussed on the blog. This blog itself is quite young – we have 44 posts published, of which 24 are QotW posts.

Why do we do it?

On the Internet, getting visitors to your site is the key metric – QotW is another avenue to get what we do in front of a wider audience. Our QotW blog posts link to questions, answers, community members and external sites where relevant in order to add context and depth, showcasing our site, and this is demonstrated in our referrer stats: we get good traffic from slashdot, reddit, facebook, twitter as well as Bruce Schneier and Dan Kaminsky’s blogs, and even explainxkcd.com so we are doing something right and gaining visibility.

How do we do it?

@Iszi’s answer here lists the process in detail, but to summarise:

We post a QotW meta question on a Friday to invite ideas for the following week. In order to avoid dupes, we maintain a list of previous questions featured on the blog, as well as those which have been proposed but not yet published.

By Tuesday we have topic and author decided (typically individuals volunteer on our chat room, the DMZ - feel free to become a volunteer, we can add you as a contributor role on the blog site.)

The administrators manage the workflow planning through a Trello workspace.

QotW posts aren’t expected to be in depth treatises so drafts are ready by Thursday morning so they can be reviewed in time for a midday Friday publication (we’ve gone with UTC timing for this schedule as we have members from Australia to west coast USA)

Why should you contribute?

First, and most importantly, because you want to. You’ve seen something interesting happening on the site, or have an interesting topic you want to cover and you’d like to share it with the world.

Did we mention it is a nice addition to your careers.stackoverflow.com or LinkedIn profile?

In addition, you help grow the community you are a member of (now over 8000 individuals – a good blog post can more than double the rate of new users joining that day). Your words and name will be attracting the up and coming security experts of tomorrow.

We welcome all contributors to the blog, and the light touch of the QotW posts is a relatively easy way to start security blogging. Seasoned reviewers will be more than happy to assist.

Liked this post? Have questions of a security nature of your own? Security expert and want to help others? Come and join us at security.stackexchange.com.

QotW #24: Why do people tell me not to use VLANs for security?

2012-04-20 by scottpack. 1 comments

This week’s question of the week was asked by user jtnire who was asking a question very near and dear to those security professionals who came out of networking or systems backgrounds. He was doing some network design and came across a classic statement that, “VLANs are Not a Security Tool”.

As of this writing, jtnire had not accepted any answers, however user Rory McCune was leading the pack of answers. Rory focused primarily on the classic human problem of misconfiguration, particularly easy when we’re talking about typing Gi/0/4 when you meant Gi/1/4, as opposed to plugging a cable into the wrong port. He also specifically called out VLAN Hopping, which can abuse a misconfiguration to allow a malicious user access to a non-authorized VLAN.

User and moderator Rory Alsop, speaking from an audit perspective, expanded on what the other Rory mentioned and focused more generally on what would make him double-take. He pointed out that VLANs are generally used for cheap network segmentation and that if you’re using them for as a security tool, then you probably want to do it right and use a physically isolated network instead.

Jakob Borg came in with a completely different approach. He explained that, as an ISP, VLANs are a crucial component of their environment and when done right can be a very powerful tool from both a security and service prospective. User jliendo largely agreed with Jakob that configuration is king, and when configured properly is an excellent tool in your security arsenal. He also went into more technical detail about some of the possible attacks against VLANs and how they can be mitigated.

In this author’s opinion this is a fantastic question as VLANs are becoming an extremely common mechanism for network isolation. The answers also did a great job of coming at the problem from all manner of angles, from external auditors to in the trenches technicians.

Liked this question of the week? Interested in reading it or adding an answer? See the question in full. Have questions of a security nature of your own? Security expert and want to help others? Come and join us at security.stackexchange.com.

QotW #23: Why is it difficult to catch Anonymous/Lulzsec?

2012-04-13 by roryalsop. 2 comments

This weeks question of the week was asked by user claws back in February 2011 and while a lot has happened since then, it is still a very valid question.

The top scoring answer, “What makes you think they don’t get caught”, by atdre, while more of a challenge to the original question, has proven to be quite appropriate, as over the last year various alleged members of Anonymous have been caught. Some through informants, others through intelligence work, however the remainder of the answers focus on the technical and structural reasons why Anonymous continues to be a major force on the Internet.

SteveS, Purge, mrnap, tylerl and others  mention the usual way attackers hide on the Internet – using machines in other countries, generally owned by unwitting individuals who have not protected them sufficiently (This includes botnets – but there are also willing botnets, provided by followers of Anonymous – who allow their machines to be used for attacks) and by routing through networks such as TOR (The Onion Router) so that even if law enforcement try to trace the connection back they will fail either because there are too many connections to track, or because some of the connections will pass through countries where the Internet Service Providers are not able or willing to assist with the trace.

I think Eli hit the nail on the head, however with “because anonymous can be anyone, literally” – as while there are certainly a core group of skilled and motivated individuals, there are many thousands of individuals who will contribute to an attack, and these individuals may be different from one month to the next as the nature of Anonymous allows people to join and take part as and when they want to, if a particular cause is of interest to them.

The Lulzsec spinoff from Anonymous appeared to be a deliberately short lived group who wanted to do something less political, and more for “the lulz” – focusing on large corporates and security organisations to highlight weaknesses in controls, and nealmcb provided links in comments to articles on this group in particular. In terms of detection, the same comments apply here as to the wider Anonymous group.

Liked this question of the week? Interested in reading it or adding an answer? See the question in full. Have questions of a security nature of your own? Security expert and want to help others? Come and join us at security.stackexchange.com

Tor: Exploiting the weakest link

2012-04-10 by lucaskauffman. 9 comments

Since the birth of the internet, there has been censorship. People have always been looking for ways to anonymously access the internet, either by proxy or VPN, however these still (can) log traffic origin and destination.

Since a few years there have been a few projects to anonymize traffic. One of the more famous ones is Tor (The Onion Router).

How Tor works

Tor uses servers and clients. When you request a webpage from your client, Tor will make an encrypted request to a randomly selected relay server called an Onion router. This Onion router knows who you are. Next thing the router does is ask another Onion router to relay the message. This second Onion router only knows the first Onion router. The second asks a third, the third asks the fourth, etc. No single router knows the complete route, however the client does.

The client can access a database which holds all the relays and if he wants, he can select his own route or a random route is selected. He then gets all the public keys for the route and encrypts his message in reverse order, starting with the public key of the last node, than the one to last node, etc. So the encryption is layered (just like the layers of an onion). However there is also a message for every node that contains the next hop. Now at the exit router the message is decrypted completely and the request for the webpage is made. For the webserver that serves the question, the client’s IP is the IP of the exit node.

The weakest link

So traffic is encrypted multiple times and relayed through different servers. This ensures anonymity. However… everyone can set up a Tor exit node … and everyone that has an exit node, can monitor the traffic.

The weakness in this technology is one we find in other technologies as well, the so called “user”.

A lot of people are concerned about their anonymity and figure they are safe when using Tor. They forget that when using a physical line or an encrypted Wifi AP, The chances of getting a Man in the Middle Attack (MMA) is small.

Now because we can easily host an exit node, we can sniff traffic from people who think they are anonymous, a lot of people in fact. At 20 Mbit (the max speed we allowed Tor to use), we got about 200 different Facebook sessions a day.

Facebook

Users forget about certain things, like facebook over https. I’ve heard people say “I’ve enabled https on my facebook account, so when I log in, I’m safe.” Well that’s good for them but they forget that often, if you do not explicitly state https for the facebook login page, your password and username is sent PLAIN TEXT over the internet. Facebook doesn’t know you want a secure line before you are logged in.Obviously this goes up for a lot of different sites other than Facebook.

The whole point of Tor is to be anonymous, but users get facebook accounts with often their full name and address on it, and then log in insecurelly.

One could write a script (and we made a proof of concept), that looks for usernames and passwords or hijacks sessions and automatically goes to a facebook like page “I am using Tor to be anonymous”.

I am not saying Tor is unsafe, all we wanted to proof is that people need to think twice before thinking they are anonymous and safe on the internet. There will always be people that want to do malicious stuff. We could have hijacked about 20 accounts in half an hour and revealed people who use Tor or get into their emailboxes. (like Dan Egerstad also prooved in 2007).

Youtube Video

The comments in the clip are in Dutch, but basically we set up a tor node and used tshark to capture traffic. We specified we were interested in http traffic coming/going from Facebook. We then took the session cookie and injected it into our browser which then automatically logs us into Facebook as that user.

Conclusion

Tor is a good anonymity provider, but like all tools, you need to use it in the correct way.

QotW #22: What are legal/ethical concerns to bear in mind, when hacking websites with open invitations?

2012-04-06 by ninefingers. 2 comments

This weeks question of the week was asked by user Yoav Aner, who wanted to understand the legal and ethical concerns of executing an attack on a web site which carried a notice inviting attacks. Yoav specifically wanted to know what, if any contractual implications there were and if it were not specified, how far would be too far. This spun off into two further questions - What security measures to have before openly allowing security researchers to hack your site and What security concerns should one bear in mind when hacking open-invitation websites? so this post will look at all three.

Before we start, I must re-iterate: we are security professionals here, not lawyers, so if in doubt, consult a lawyer.

Legal and ethical concerns:

The answer Yoav accepted was provided by Rory McCune, who raised the point that ultimately, a no holds barred approach is extremely unlikely to be acceptable in any circumstance. Rory highlighted the importance of ensuring the page in question was written by the administrators of the site, as opposed to being supplied through user content. Clearly, unless it is clear the page was written by someone with the authority to make that kind of invitation, attacking it would definitely be hostile.

Another excellent point raised in this answer was that some companies actively invite finding bugs in their web sites and products, provided you follow a number of guidelines. More on this can be found in the answer itself.

Finally, Rory touched on what many people may forget – although the website may invite attempted break-ins, it may actually be illegal where you are even to make the attempt.

Our next answer was provided by Security moderator, user and blogger Rory Alsop. According to Rory, one problem when dealing with this kind of issue is that no test cases have yet passed through the courts – so until they do, it’s unlikely any precedent has been established for dealing with these kinds of issues. Rory also raised the criminal activity point again. Always understand that the law of your country/jurisdiction still applies.

Next up, Rory explained that during a penetration test a contract established for the work may include rules about what should happen, how far a test may go, who should be notified if a vulnerability is found etc. Even with this safeguard, there is still the potential for legal action should something break. Rory advised logging absolutely everything that was going on so as to have proof of actions.

When applied to the website scenario, Rory pointed out that in this case there is no signed contract establishing this understanding, just an implication of one which neither party is legally bound to.

That is all for answers on this question. I tend to miss questions on ethics on the main site, so writing them up is actually quite interesting. As such, I am going to summarise the key points below:

  1. The rules of engagement are not well established. Assuming a “feel free to hack this message” we have no idea to what extent that is actually what they mean. By contrast, penetration testing is usually better scoped.
  2. The author of the page might not have the authority to make such an invitation. As I was reading this, I did wonder – if this is a shared host, the administrator of the site is a different person from the company who owns and maintains the box. So even though the site author can put up this message, they’re not actually entitled to make that call (and it probably violates the ToS on their hosting package).
  3. It may be illegal to engage in the act of attempting, whether or not the site in question has given you permission.
  4. Some sites actively encourage hunting for bugs.

Security concerns when hacking open-invitation websites:

Iszi raised the following worries on his question

  • The site could be a honeypot, run by government or other entities looking to gather information about active (or would-be) hackers.
  • The site could be set up by a black-hat as a honeypot to gather a list of interesting, hackable amateurs to target.
  • A third-party black-hat could potentially access the site’s logs and farm them for data about interesting, hackable amateurs to target.

Lucas Kauffman confirmed that he had a school project where he faked an open sendmail relay and

just piped all the incoming emails to a python script that got all the destinations out, generating my own spamlist. I think in the end after about 3 weeks I had close to 300.000 different email addresses.

Rory Alsop focused on the reputational and professional risks, as the host of the site will be able to see everything you did in their logs…do you ever mistype commands, use dir instead of ls, accidentally stray outside the scope of the test? This will be recorded and could negatively impact you.

Think about what you are divulging when hacking a website….

  • Your methodology
  • Your tools
  • Your mistakes?
  • etc

Finally – Yoav also asked a question focusing on the other side,

What security measures should I have in place before inviting people to hack my website?

Ttfd’s answer went into some considerable detail on the practical logistics – how you think about the problem is probably as important as actually implementing security in this situation:

  1. Do you have the money to do that?
  2. Do you have the resources? (servers, security teams and etc)
  3. How far can you limit the damages a hacker can make to your system? I.E. If a hacker hacks into your server what access will he have ? Will he be able to connect to your database and retrieve/store/update data? Is your data encrypted ? Will he be able to decrypt it? (and so on)
  4. Can your security team find how a hacker exploited your system?
  5. Does your security team have the skills to fix problems that may occur ?
  6. Probably many more questions that you need to ask and answer before you decide.

M15K gave a summarised answer

I can’t imagine very many positive scenarios in declaring open season on you’re front door will result in something useful. But let’s say you do, and you do get some positive feedback. Are you and your security team in a position to remediate those vulnerabilities?

Interesting stuff! All in all, this looks like a relatively risky business on both sides, so core to the decision must be a full understanding of the risks, and how these match to your risk appetite. If you are hosting such a site, you may get some valuable information into attack techniques, but you need to protect yourself from an escalation from the attack environment to your own systems. If you are testing the site, think about the risks you may be facing, and plan accordingly.

Liked this question of the week? Interested in reading it or adding an answer? See the question in full. Have questions of a security nature of your own? Security expert and want to help others? Come and join us at security.stackexchange.com

SSL Chain Cert Fun with Nessus

2012-04-03 by scottpack. 1 comments

My workplace recently, for some definitions of recent, switched the company we use for certificate signing to InCommon. There were quite a few technical/administrative advantages, and since we’re educational, price was a big factor. Everyone has been really happy with the results. Well, except for this one thing.  InCommon is not a top level trusted CA, they chain through AddTrust. This isn’t actually all that big a deal, really, as AddTrust is a common CA to have in your trusted bundle, and all we had to do was configure the InCommon chain certificate on our web servers. Other than the occasional chain breakage on some mobile browsers everything seemed peachy. Except, that is, when we ran a vulnerability scan.

Shortly after we switched we started noticing some odd alerts coming out of our vulnerability scans. At first one or two were reporting that the SSL certificate could not be validated. We manually verified the certificates, declared them as false positives, and moved on. Over time more and more systems started reporting this error. Eventually the problem had propagated out far enough that I started digging into it. For reference, the PluginID we’re looking at here is 51192.

I learned two very important, and relevant, pieces of information that day:

  1. Nessus was not properly validating the chain.
  2. Chain Certificate files are a little stranger than expected.

Instead of using a system default CA bundle, Nessus ships with its own. You can find the bundle, called known_CA.inc, in the plugin directory. So on Linux systems you should be looking at /opt/nessus/lib/nessus/plugins/known_CA.inc. If you are using a Windows scanner, well, you’re on your own. This is a fairly standard looking CA bundle, and I found that AddTrust was, in fact, included. I did not, however, find any reference to InCommon. Since they are somehow related to Internet2 I looked for them, also no luck.

This isn’t really that big a deal, though. Nessus will also look for, but will not update, a secondary bundle called custom_CA.inc. In most cases, this file would be used to include a local CA, for instance in a closed corporate network where one generates self-signed certificates as a matter of course. However, since you can use it to include arbitrary CA certs we can use it to fix our problem.

It’s easy enough for me to get the intermediate cert, what with it being public and all. This is where things started to get a little weird, though. In order to stay consistent with the known_CA.inc I included the certificate as a decoded X.509+PEM. Placing only the intermediate cert in this file resulted in, again, the certificate chain failing to validate. Next, what follows is a Nessus debugging tip that was roughly an hour’s worth of swearing in the discovering:

If you don’t think the web interface is showing you sufficient information, look at the plugin output in the raw XML.

You can get this by either exporting the report, or by finding it in the user’s reports folder on the scanner. What I discovered was that all of the various and sundry certificates were being read and validated. The chain, however, was being checked in the wrong order, in this case: webserver->AddTrust->InCommon.

After a little more trial and error I learned that, not only, did I need to have both the InCommon intermediate, but also the AddTrust certificates in my custom_CA.inc file, but that the order of the certs in the file also mattered. As it happens, AddTrust had to be entered first, followed by InCommon. This does make some amount of sense, when I adjusted my thought process to an actual chain where AddTrust was the “top-level”.

For completeness, I copied the newly complete custom_CA.inc file to my test webserver and included it as a chain cert using the SSLCertificateChainFile option. This is Apache httpd on Linux, you nginx or IIS folks are on your own. After removing the custom_CA.inc on the Nessus scanner and re-running the scan resulted in the certificate properly validating.

This left me in a good place in two ways:

  1. I now had a properly formatted custom_CA.inc file that I could put into puppet for all the scanners.
  2. I now also had a properly formatted chain cert file for inclusion on the web servers.

This fixes the problem from both sides, the server presenting all the correct information, as well as the scanner for cleaning up a false positive. For reference, included below is the chain cert file that was generated. As mentioned previously, it is the same format as a CA bundle. For each certificate you’ll find the ASCII text decoded certificate information, followed by the Base64 encoded PEM version of the same certificate. In my testing, Nessus would accept only the PEM versions, however I wanted to include both outputs since it appears to be the standard.

Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            7f:71:c1:d3:a2:26:b0:d2:b1:13:f3:e6:81:67:64:3e
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root
        Validity
            Not Before: Dec  7 00:00:00 2010 GMT
            Not After : May 30 10:48:38 2020 GMT
        Subject: C=US, O=Internet2, OU=InCommon, CN=InCommon Server CA
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:97:7c:c7:c8:fe:b3:e9:20:6a:a3:a4:4f:8e:8e:
                    34:56:06:b3:7a:6c:aa:10:9b:48:61:2b:36:90:69:
                    e3:34:0a:47:a7:bb:7b:de:aa:6a:fb:eb:82:95:8f:
                    ca:1d:7f:af:75:a6:a8:4c:da:20:67:61:1a:0d:86:
                    c1:ca:c1:87:af:ac:4e:e4:de:62:1b:2f:9d:b1:98:
                    af:c6:01:fb:17:70:db:ac:14:59:ec:6f:3f:33:7f:
                    a6:98:0b:e4:e2:38:af:f5:7f:85:6d:0e:74:04:9d:
                    f6:27:86:c7:9b:8f:e7:71:2a:08:f4:03:02:40:63:
                    24:7d:40:57:8f:54:e0:54:7e:b6:13:48:61:f1:de:
                    ce:0e:bd:b6:fa:4d:98:b2:d9:0d:8d:79:a6:e0:aa:
                    cd:0c:91:9a:a5:df:ab:73:bb:ca:14:78:5c:47:29:
                    a1:ca:c5:ba:9f:c7:da:60:f7:ff:e7:7f:f2:d9:da:
                    a1:2d:0f:49:16:a7:d3:00:92:cf:8a:47:d9:4d:f8:
                    d5:95:66:d3:74:f9:80:63:00:4f:4c:84:16:1f:b3:
                    f5:24:1f:a1:4e:de:e8:95:d6:b2:0b:09:8b:2c:6b:
                    c7:5c:2f:8c:63:c9:99:cb:52:b1:62:7b:73:01:62:
                    7f:63:6c:d8:68:a0:ee:6a:a8:8d:1f:29:f3:d0:18:
                    ac:ad
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                keyid:AD:BD:98:7A:34:B4:26:F7:FA:C4:26:54:EF:03:BD:E0:24:CB:54:1A

            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                 48:4F:5A:FA:2F:4A:9A:5E:E0:50:F3:6B:7B:55:A5:DE:F5:BE:34:5D             X509v3 Key Usage: critical                 Certificate Sign, CRL Sign             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                 CA:TRUE, pathlen:0             X509v3 Certificate Policies:                 Policy: X509v3 Any Policy

            X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:

                Full Name:                   URI:http://crl.usertrust.com/AddTrustExternalCARoot.crl

            Authority Information Access:                 CA Issuers - URI:http://crt.usertrust.com/AddTrustExternalCARoot.p7c                 CA Issuers - URI:http://crt.usertrust.com/AddTrustUTNSGCCA.crt                 OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.usertrust.com

    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption         93:66:21:80:74:45:85:4b:c2:ab:ce:32:b0:29:fe:dd:df:d6:         24:5b:bf:03:6a:6f:50:3e:0e:1b:b3:0d:88:a3:5b:ee:c4:a4:         12:3b:56:ef:06:7f:cf:7f:21:95:56:3b:41:31:fe:e1:aa:93:         d2:95:f3:95:0d:3c:47:ab:ca:5c:26:ad:3e:f1:f9:8c:34:6e:         11:be:f4:67:e3:02:49:f9:a6:7c:7b:64:25:dd:17:46:f2:50:         e3:e3:0a:21:3a:49:24:cd:c6:84:65:68:67:68:b0:45:2d:47:         99:cd:9c:ab:86:29:11:72:dc:d6:9c:36:43:74:f3:d4:97:9e:         56:a0:fe:5f:40:58:d2:d5:d7:7e:7c:c5:8e:1a:b2:04:5c:92:         66:0e:85:ad:2e:06:ce:c8:a3:d8:eb:14:27:91:de:cf:17:30:         81:53:b6:66:12:ad:37:e4:f5:ef:96:5c:20:0e:36:e9:ac:62:         7d:19:81:8a:f5:90:61:a6:49:ab:ce:3c:df:e6:ca:64:ee:82:         65:39:45:95:16:ba:41:06:00:98:ba:0c:56:61:e4:c6:c6:86:         01:cf:66:a9:22:29:02:d6:3d:cf:c4:2a:8d:99:de:fb:09:14:         9e:0e:d1:d5:c6:d7:81:dd:ad:24:ab:ac:07:05:e2:1d:68:c3:         70:66:5f:d3 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEwzCCA6ugAwIBAgIQf3HB06ImsNKxE/PmgWdkPjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBv MQswCQYDVQQGEwJTRTEUMBIGA1UEChMLQWRkVHJ1c3QgQUIxJjAkBgNVBAsTHUFk ZFRydXN0IEV4dGVybmFsIFRUUCBOZXR3b3JrMSIwIAYDVQQDExlBZGRUcnVzdCBF eHRlcm5hbCBDQSBSb290MB4XDTEwMTIwNzAwMDAwMFoXDTIwMDUzMDEwNDgzOFow UTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEjAQBgNVBAoTCUludGVybmV0MjERMA8GA1UECxMISW5D b21tb24xGzAZBgNVBAMTEkluQ29tbW9uIFNlcnZlciBDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJd8x8j+s+kgaqOkT46ONFYGs3psqhCbSGErNpBp 4zQKR6e7e96qavvrgpWPyh1/r3WmqEzaIGdhGg2GwcrBh6+sTuTeYhsvnbGYr8YB +xdw26wUWexvPzN/ppgL5OI4r/V/hW0OdASd9ieGx5uP53EqCPQDAkBjJH1AV49U 4FR+thNIYfHezg69tvpNmLLZDY15puCqzQyRmqXfq3O7yhR4XEcpocrFup/H2mD3 /+d/8tnaoS0PSRan0wCSz4pH2U341ZVm03T5gGMAT0yEFh+z9SQfoU7e6JXWsgsJ iyxrx1wvjGPJmctSsWJ7cwFif2Ns2Gig7mqojR8p89AYrK0CAwEAAaOCAXcwggFz MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFK29mHo0tCb3+sQmVO8DveAky1QaMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRIT1r6 L0qaXuBQ82t7VaXe9b40XTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB /wIBADARBgNVHSAECjAIMAYGBFUdIAAwRAYDVR0fBD0wOzA5oDegNYYzaHR0cDov L2NybC51c2VydHJ1c3QuY29tL0FkZFRydXN0RXh0ZXJuYWxDQVJvb3QuY3JsMIGz BggrBgEFBQcBAQSBpjCBozA/BggrBgEFBQcwAoYzaHR0cDovL2NydC51c2VydHJ1 c3QuY29tL0FkZFRydXN0RXh0ZXJuYWxDQVJvb3QucDdjMDkGCCsGAQUFBzAChi1o dHRwOi8vY3J0LnVzZXJ0cnVzdC5jb20vQWRkVHJ1c3RVVE5TR0NDQS5jcnQwJQYI KwYBBQUHMAGGGWh0dHA6Ly9vY3NwLnVzZXJ0cnVzdC5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF BQADggEBAJNmIYB0RYVLwqvOMrAp/t3f1iRbvwNqb1A+DhuzDYijW+7EpBI7Vu8G f89/IZVWO0Ex/uGqk9KV85UNPEerylwmrT7x+Yw0bhG+9GfjAkn5pnx7ZCXdF0by UOPjCiE6SSTNxoRlaGdosEUtR5nNnKuGKRFy3NacNkN089SXnlag/l9AWNLV1358 xY4asgRckmYOha0uBs7Io9jrFCeR3s8XMIFTtmYSrTfk9e+WXCAONumsYn0ZgYr1 kGGmSavOPN/mymTugmU5RZUWukEGAJi6DFZh5MbGhgHPZqkiKQLWPc/EKo2Z3vsJ FJ4O0dXG14HdrSSrrAcF4h1ow3BmX9M= -----END CERTIFICATE----- Certificate:     Data:         Version: 3 (0x2)         Serial Number: 1 (0x1)         Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption         Issuer: C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root         Validity             Not Before: May 30 10:48:38 2000 GMT             Not After : May 30 10:48:38 2020 GMT         Subject: C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root         Subject Public Key Info:             Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption                 Public-Key: (2048 bit)                 Modulus:                     00:b7:f7:1a:33:e6:f2:00:04:2d:39:e0:4e:5b:ed:                     1f:bc:6c:0f:cd:b5:fa:23:b6:ce:de:9b:11:33:97:                     a4:29:4c:7d:93:9f:bd:4a:bc:93:ed:03:1a:e3:8f:                     cf:e5:6d:50:5a:d6:97:29:94:5a:80:b0:49:7a:db:                     2e:95:fd:b8:ca:bf:37:38:2d:1e:3e:91:41:ad:70:                     56:c7:f0:4f:3f:e8:32:9e:74:ca:c8:90:54:e9:c6:                     5f:0f:78:9d:9a:40:3c:0e:ac:61:aa:5e:14:8f:9e:                     87:a1:6a:50:dc:d7:9a:4e:af:05:b3:a6:71:94:9c:                     71:b3:50:60:0a:c7:13:9d:38:07:86:02:a8:e9:a8:                     69:26:18:90:ab:4c:b0:4f:23:ab:3a:4f:84:d8:df:                     ce:9f:e1:69:6f:bb:d7:42:d7:6b:44:e4:c7:ad:ee:                     6d:41:5f:72:5a:71:08:37:b3:79:65:a4:59:a0:94:                     37:f7:00:2f:0d:c2:92:72:da:d0:38:72:db:14:a8:                     45:c4:5d:2a:7d:b7:b4:d6:c4:ee:ac:cd:13:44:b7:                     c9:2b:dd:43:00:25:fa:61:b9:69:6a:58:23:11:b7:                     a7:33:8f:56:75:59:f5:cd:29:d7:46:b7:0a:2b:65:                     b6:d3:42:6f:15:b2:b8:7b:fb:ef:e9:5d:53:d5:34:                     5a:27                 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)         X509v3 extensions:             X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                 AD:BD:98:7A:34:B4:26:F7:FA:C4:26:54:EF:03:BD:E0:24:CB:54:1A             X509v3 Key Usage:                 Certificate Sign, CRL Sign             X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                 CA:TRUE             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:                 keyid:AD:BD:98:7A:34:B4:26:F7:FA:C4:26:54:EF:03:BD:E0:24:CB:54:1A                 DirName:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root                 serial:01

    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption         b0:9b:e0:85:25:c2:d6:23:e2:0f:96:06:92:9d:41:98:9c:d9:         84:79:81:d9:1e:5b:14:07:23:36:65:8f:b0:d8:77:bb:ac:41:         6c:47:60:83:51:b0:f9:32:3d:e7:fc:f6:26:13:c7:80:16:a5:         bf:5a:fc:87:cf:78:79:89:21:9a:e2:4c:07:0a:86:35:bc:f2:         de:51:c4:d2:96:b7:dc:7e:4e:ee:70:fd:1c:39:eb:0c:02:51:         14:2d:8e:bd:16:e0:c1:df:46:75:e7:24:ad:ec:f4:42:b4:85:         93:70:10:67:ba:9d:06:35:4a:18:d3:2b:7a:cc:51:42:a1:7a:         63:d1:e6:bb:a1:c5:2b:c2:36:be:13:0d:e6:bd:63:7e:79:7b:         a7:09:0d:40:ab:6a:dd:8f:8a:c3:f6:f6:8c:1a:42:05:51:d4:         45:f5:9f:a7:62:21:68:15:20:43:3c:99:e7:7c:bd:24:d8:a9:         91:17:73:88:3f:56:1b:31:38:18:b4:71:0f:9a:cd:c8:0e:9e:         8e:2e:1b:e1:8c:98:83:cb:1f:31:f1:44:4c:c6:04:73:49:76:         60:0f:c7:f8:bd:17:80:6b:2e:e9:cc:4c:0e:5a:9a:79:0f:20:         0a:2e:d5:9e:63:26:1e:55:92:94:d8:82:17:5a:7b:d0:bc:c7:         8f:4e:86:04 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIENjCCAx6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBvMQswCQYDVQQGEwJTRTEU MBIGA1UEChMLQWRkVHJ1c3QgQUIxJjAkBgNVBAsTHUFkZFRydXN0IEV4dGVybmFs IFRUUCBOZXR3b3JrMSIwIAYDVQQDExlBZGRUcnVzdCBFeHRlcm5hbCBDQSBSb290 MB4XDTAwMDUzMDEwNDgzOFoXDTIwMDUzMDEwNDgzOFowbzELMAkGA1UEBhMCU0Ux FDASBgNVBAoTC0FkZFRydXN0IEFCMSYwJAYDVQQLEx1BZGRUcnVzdCBFeHRlcm5h bCBUVFAgTmV0d29yazEiMCAGA1UEAxMZQWRkVHJ1c3QgRXh0ZXJuYWwgQ0EgUm9v dDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALf3GjPm8gAELTngTlvt H7xsD821+iO2zt6bETOXpClMfZOfvUq8k+0DGuOPz+VtUFrWlymUWoCwSXrbLpX9 uMq/NzgtHj6RQa1wVsfwTz/oMp50ysiQVOnGXw94nZpAPA6sYapeFI+eh6FqUNzX mk6vBbOmcZSccbNQYArHE504B4YCqOmoaSYYkKtMsE8jqzpPhNjfzp/haW+710LX a0Tkx63ubUFfclpxCDezeWWkWaCUN/cALw3CknLa0Dhy2xSoRcRdKn23tNbE7qzN E0S3ySvdQwAl+mG5aWpYIxG3pzOPVnVZ9c0p10a3CitlttNCbxWyuHv77+ldU9U0 WicCAwEAAaOB3DCB2TAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUrb2YejS0Jvf6xCZU7wO94CTLVBowCwYD VR0PBAQDAgEGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wgZkGA1UdIwSBkTCBjoAUrb2YejS0 Jvf6xCZU7wO94CTLVBqhc6RxMG8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlNFMRQwEgYDVQQKEwtBZGRU cnVzdCBBQjEmMCQGA1UECxMdQWRkVHJ1c3QgRXh0ZXJuYWwgVFRQIE5ldHdvcmsx IjAgBgNVBAMTGUFkZFRydXN0IEV4dGVybmFsIENBIFJvb3SCAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEFBQADggEBALCb4IUlwtYj4g+WBpKdQZic2YR5gdkeWxQHIzZlj7DYd7usQWxH YINRsPkyPef89iYTx4AWpb9a/IfPeHmJIZriTAcKhjW88t5RxNKWt9x+Tu5w/Rw5 6wwCURQtjr0W4MHfRnXnJK3s9EK0hZNwEGe6nQY1ShjTK3rMUUKhemPR5ruhxSvC Nr4TDea9Y355e6cJDUCrat2PisP29owaQgVR1EX1n6diIWgVIEM8med8vSTYqZEX c4g/VhsxOBi0cQ+azcgOno4uG+GMmIPLHzHxREzGBHNJdmAPx/i9F4BrLunMTA5a mnkPIAou1Z5jJh5VkpTYghdae9C8x49OhgQ= -----END CERTIFICATE-----